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The paper studies aspects of the process and substance of the deliberations of the 
Convention on the Future of the Union, against the backdrop of the longer term development 
of a Constitution for the European Union. It examines some of the issues which have arisen 
over the course of the longer term debate about European constitutionalism, including the 
normative basis of a putative Constitution for the EU. In the main part of the paper, the 
primary objective is to elaborate in more detail the ways in which the Convention’s work was 
structured by the complex procedural and substantive heritage of the Union’s constitutional 
acquis. It focuses on the Convention as an addition to an already complex and multi-facetted 
constitution-building process, and looks at some of the principles which it has proposed to 
bring into the constitutional architecture, such as the explicit articulation of the supremacy 
principle. It concludes that at times the fit between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ in the constitutional 
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Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich vor dem Hintergrund der Entwicklung einer europäischen 
Verfassung mit inhaltlichen und prozeduralen Aspekten der Verhandlungen innerhalb des 
Konvents zur Zukunft  der Europäischen Union. Er untersucht einige  der Themen zum 
europäischem Konstitutionalismus, die im Laufe der Debatte angesprochen wurden. Dies 
betrifft die normative Basis einer mutmasslichen Verfassung für die EU. Im Hauptteil des 
Beitrags besteht das hauptsächliche Interesse darin, die Art und Weise, in der die Arbeit des 
Konvents durch das komplexe prozedurale und substanzielle Erbe des konstitutionellen 
acquis der Union strukturiert worden ist, detailliert aufzuzeigen. Er konzentriert sich auf den 
Konvent als ein zusätzliches Mittel in einem bereits komplexen und facettenreichen  
verfassungsbildenden Prozess, und er analysiert einige der Prinzipien, deren Eingang in die 
Verfassungsarchitektur versprochen worden war, wie beispielsweise die explizite Nennung 
des Superioritätsprinzips. Der Text schließt mit der Erkenntnis, dass die Übereinstimmung 
zwischen “Altem” und “Neuem” im Verfassungsprozess und seinem vom Konvent 
entwickelten Inhalt längst nicht zufriedenstellend ist. 
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1. Introduction 
Even before its creation was formally announced in December 2001 at the Laeken European 
Council meeting, very substantial expectations were invested in the Convention on the 
Future of the Union by many observers of the European integration process. Perhaps it 
could finally address the yawning legitimacy gap that appears to have opened up in 
European public affairs since the time of the Treaty of Maastricht, leading to a widespread 
alienation between the activities of the European institutions and those whom they are meant 
– like any public bodies – to serve, that is, the citizens and residents of the Member States. 
Of course, bridging the legitimacy gap was only one of the ideas motivating those 
responsible for establishing the Convention. It was additionally supposed to engage 
discussion amongst a wider range of elites on questions of reform than had hitherto been 
achieved in the context of intergovernmental conferences (‘IGCs’) and to deal with a number 
of intractable problems, especially those related to institutional reform in the context of 
enlargement, the solution of which had eluded the negotiators in the IGCs of 1996–97 and 
2000. 
While it was never likely to be a panacea for all the (real and imagined) evils of the European 
Union (‘EU’ or ‘Union’), the Convention quickly began to engage, with an intensity never 
before seen in a European institution, with practical questions about the establishment of a 
formal constitutional foundation for the EU. The Laeken mandate for the Convention 
contained in fact little direct focus on the constitutional question, but provided instead a 
general analysis of the ‘state’ of the European integration process and the challenges it 
faces, harked back in particular to the four issues (competences, status of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, simplification of the treaties and the r ole of national parliaments) 
articulated in the Declaration No. 23 on the Future of the Union appended to the Treaty of 
Nice in December 2000, and set out many questions – some fifty-six – which it saw as 
underpinning the diagnosis. What the Laeken Declaration also provided  – for the first time 
ever in a document endorsed by all the Heads of State and Government of the EU’s Member 
States – was a specific reference to the ‘C’ word, in a passage contemplating a trajectory 
‘Towards a Constitution for European citizens’. The discussion in the text is specifically linked 
to the question of simplification and reorganisation, changes which are assumed to be linked 
in turn to the goal of transparency. The Declaration then asks: 
‘whether this simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the adoption 
of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features of such a constitution be? 
The values which the Union cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, 
the relationship between the Member States and the Union?’ 2 — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — I H S 
 
These issues and more preoccupied the Convention’s work. In certain respects, its work was 
the logical continuation of previous efforts to articulate a formal constitutional framework for 
the European integration process, efforts to which the European Parliament in particular has 
contributed in a very substantial way, especially through its 1984 Draft Treaty on European 
Union. To that extent, it is hardly surprising that the Laeken Declaration was not always 
treated as an authoritative source of inspiration and legitimacy for the Convention, since the 
Convention has projected itself as having an even wider and grander vision which is not 
restricted by the already wide-ranging analysis offered by Laeken. As Andrew Duff, ELDR 
MEP and member of the Convention, rather dramatically declared in a mid-Convention 
interview, ‘Nobody reads the Laeken Declaration any longer’.
1 
A different sort of bigger picture is offered in this paper. By no means has the Convention 
operated against the background of a constitutional  tabula rasa  in relation to either the 
process of constitution-building or the substantive constitutional choices which it is making. 
The Treaties and indeed the Union’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed in 
declaratory form in 2000 were not the only sources of constitutional  acquis which the 
Convention had to grapple with in developing the text which its President presented to the 
European Council in Thessaloniki in late June 2003. Constitution-building in the EU since the 
inception of the first treaties has comprised a set of complex interactions and tensions 
between the Treaty texts and other formal institutional documents, on the one hand, and 
their interpretation by key actors, notably the Court of Justice, but also the national courts, 
and the other non-judicial EU institutions, on the other. This has been characterised as a 
distinction between the ‘formal’ and ‘real’ constitutions of the EU (de Búrca, 1999). 
These interactions and tensions map onto both the procedural and substantive dimensions 
of the Convention’s work. For example, in relation to procedural questions such as ‘how, 
when and where does constitutional development of the EU take place?’, it is clear that 
constitutional development o ccurs in a number of overlapping forums, such as 
Intergovernmental Conferences, national ratification processes for new treaties (which have 
included some key national constitutional court judgments
2), and subsequent interpretations 
and applications of the treaties by the Court of Justice and other institutional actors. The 
question which this paper considers is how the Convention has added to the process of the 
development of the acquis through its working methods and through the management of the 
process by key actors such as President Giscard d’Estaing. In relation to the substantive 
content of the current European constitutional framework, the general principles of law 
articulated by the Court of Justice via its jurisdiction founded on Article 220 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (‘EC’) are often as important as the specific treaty 
                                                 
1   Duff 2003. 
2   Most famously the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Maastricht and the German 
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texts, although the Court did announce in the 1986 case of Les Verts
3 that the EC Treaty can 
be characterised as the Community’s constitutional charter.
4 Furthermore, there are many 
key texts of a political nature, such as the Charter of Rights, a number of interinstitutional 
agreements on matters such as the budget or the operation of the legislative procedure, as 
well as legislation of a quasi-constitutional c haracter such as the rules on the electoral 
procedure for the European Parliament, which are not contained in the formal text of the 
treaties, but which one might very well expect to be encapsulated somewhere in a formal 
constitutional structure, perhaps in an annex or protocol, if not indeed (as will be the case 
with the Charter) in the main body of the Constitution itself. Overall, the Court’s so-called 
‘constitutionalisation’ of the original Treaty of Rome to incorporate federal legal features such 
as the supremacy of European Community (‘EC’) law over national law, the penetration of 
EC law into the national legal orders, and the existence of various mechanisms, notably 
direct effect, whereby individuals have been able to enforce their EC law rights in national 
courts against Member States, represents more of an elaboration of constitutional principles 
based on a reading of the ‘spirit’ of the original treaties than it does a direct derivation from 
the texts as agreed by the High Contracting Parties either in 1957 or subsequently. This 
paper looks at the use of this  acquis in the context of the development of the text of a 
Constitutional Treaty. 
In sum, the main objective of this paper is to elaborate in more detail the ways in which the 
Convention’s work was structured by the complex procedural and substantive heritage of the 
Union’s constitutional acquis. Procedural perspectives on the Convention have focused on 
the ways in which the Convention has supplemented the existing constitutionalisation 
processes of the European Union, for example, by adding an additional ‘pre-contractual’ 
phase to the process whereby Member States already agree upon changes to the 
international treaties which remain the formal construct of European integration
5 and by 
introducing the notion of consensus amongst elites as the basis for ‘agreeing’ a new 
constitutional settlement.
6 At the very least, the constitutional dialogues which shape the EU 
have been immeasurably enriched by the complex constellations of interest intermediation 
which the Convention comprised in its plenary debates, working groups, and discussion 
circles, and in its draft texts and amendments.
7 Less positive commendation from the point of 
view of transparency can be given, of course, to the private discussion circles and separate 
                                                 
3   Case 294/86 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. It repeated the point in Opinion 1/91 
Draft Agreement on a European Economic Area (EEA) [1991] ECR I -6079. It is sometimes remarked upon 
that the Court has not repeated this point since the European Union famously ran aground on the sands of 
the legitimacy question, in the wake of the Maastricht ratification debacle.  
4   Some commentators caution that since the inception of the EU  – i.e. the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993  – the Court of Justice has avoided ‘constitutional’ language, and has certainly not 
characterised the overall ‘pillar framework’ introduced by the Treaty on European Union as the EU’s 
constitutional charter, as it did for the EC Treaty in Les Verts. 
5   De Witte, 2002. 
6   See generally Closa, 2003; Hoffmann, 2003; Hoffmann and Vergés Bausili, 2003. 
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delegation meetings which dominated the last four weeks of the Convention’s programme. 
The plenary became more or less marginalised in that context. Furthermore, in more or less 
open ways, the Convention and its members remained in constant dialogue with external 
interests, such as national parliaments, other European institutions, civil society and even 
academia. The Convention experience has offered as a minimum a suggestion of the 
promise of deliberation, and perhaps a great deal more than that. In the future, it is arguable 
that the renewed and indeed repeated application of the Convention method for 
treaty/constitutional amendment processes, as per Article IV-6 of the Constitution,
8 could 
lead to a comprehensive redesign of the constitutional amendment process and the eventual 
abandonment of traditional international law methods of treaty amendment. But that would 
be to assume a constitutional revolution which lies some way in the future. In the shorter 
term, it is not possible to envisage a great deal of change as the Convention declined to 
include a change in the Constitution to the existing condition that all amendments require 
unanimity in the Intergovernmental Conference and ratification by all Member States before 
entry into force. The detailed analysis of the process in this paper is limited, in Section 3, to 
one specific and narrow question concerning the emergence of a distinctive Convention 
acquis and the question of how this sits with the wider Union  acquis in the constitutional 
sphere.
9 
Shifting the focus to substantive questions (Section 4), the paper shows that the Convention 
has begun to force political actors at the national and European levels to confront more 
directly than ever before some key questions about what European constitutionalism already 
is, especially in legal terms. To what extent do they wish the realities of European 
constitutionalism (such as the principle of the supremacy of EU law) to remain hidden from 
public view in the future as in many respects they have done hitherto? And can the delicate 
balance of the national and the supranational dimensions of European integration (not to 
mention the subnational and international inputs which it experiences) survive the sometimes 
harsh scrutiny to which it is now being subjected within the confines of the Convention 
process? 
To set the scene for this discussion, the next section provides a preliminary sketch and 
synopsis of the evolution of the EU constitutional framework from the inception of the first 
treaties until the present time. The objective of this section is to show that notwithstanding 
the late arrival of the European Council and many of the Member State governments at the 
‘constitutional party’, the idea of analysing European integration in constitutionalist terms has 
been well-established for decades. While the practice has been particularly common 
amongst lawyers, it has also extended to both students and practitioners of politics.
10 At the 
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9   On the role of the acquis communautaire in relation to the governance of the EU see Wiener, 1998. 
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same time, however, the constitutional question remains highly contested in relation to the 
innumerable sub-questions which it encapsulates, including the very purpose and scope of a 
constitution for an entity such as the EU which is not formally a state in the Westphalian 
sense, albeit that it wields many instruments and undertakes many tasks of a state-like 
nature. On the contrary, it operates in some sort of ambiguous liminal space between states 
and international organisations according to the conventional definitions of national and 
international law, and it is widely regarded as deserving of analysis above all as a sui generis 
entity which cannot easily be assimilated to other known forms of political organisation. 
Above all, however, the very ethic of European constitutionalism remains contested. 
A central premise of this paper is that whatever happens with the Convention, it is important 
to develop principled reference points for viewing both the evolution of the Convention 
process and the substantive outcomes which the Convention adopts. Elsewhere I have 
argued for the importance of a critical assessment of the Convention process, in the light of 
principles of responsible and inclusive constitutionalism.
11 This paper has a separate but 
related objective to link the tensions which frame the procedural dimension of  the 
Convention to some of the key elements of its substantive debate. With that objective in 
mind, the paper looks explicitly at the constitutional  acquis as the background to the 
constitution-building process, as well as contributing to reflection upon the novelty and sui 
generis nature of the Convention process. That paradox of the rootedness of the 
Convention’s discussions in the constitutional  acquis at the same time as it proposes 
sometimes innovative solutions to apparently intractable problems will r emain, in my view, 
one of the most enduring features of the Convention experience. 
2. A brief history and synopsis of constitution-
building in the European Union 
The current ‘constitutional’ debate in the European Union is not a dramatic departure in the 
development of the ‘ever closer union’, but a continuation of longstanding debates in many 
academic and some media, opinion-former and political circles about the finality of European 
integration. Posing the question in constitutional terms is hardly new. T he German 
Government official report attached to the text of the Treaty of Paris establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, which went before the Bundestag in 1951 described 
the system to be established as ‘a European model of a constitutional type’.
12 Yet it took 
nearly fifty years for the term ‘constitution’ to reach the collective intergovernmental 
discourse of what is now the European Union in the form of the Laeken Declaration, and 
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even then it does not acquire a capital ‘C’ – although it has done so frequently in the context 
of the Convention’s deliberations. 
On the long road to Laeken and the Convention, as already mentioned in the introduction, 
the Court of Justice has made an unrivalled contribution to the reconstruction of the 
discourse of  European integration in juristic terms as a proto-constitutionalist discourse. 
Although not originally articulated in terms of a formal constitutional framework, the Court’s 
proposition that the European Communities constitutes a ‘new legal order for the b enefit of 
which states have limited their sovereignty rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects 
of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals’
13 makes it clear that any 
state which accedes to the European Union is joining something quite different to the United 
Nations or even the Council of Europe. Indeed, the Court made that very same point in 
explicit terms: ‘The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the 
functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that 
this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the 
contracting States.’
14 Even so, whatever one makes of the Court’s case law on the 
relationship between what is  now widely known as EU law and national law, on the 
development of the Community’s, and later, the Union’s own competences and of concepts 
such as implied powers or the preemption of national legislative competence, on the 
development of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, and most recently on the 
construction of citizenship rights based on the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, this still remains a relatively fractured constitutional system. It is important not to 
overstate either the completeness or the coherence of the European Union’s current 
constitutional framework.
15 There are aspects of the existing constitutional law which have 
escaped logical explanation, such as the operation of the pillar system, which are not well 
understood, such as the system governing the attribution, exercise and control of 
competences, or which are generally accepted not to be working particularly well, such as 
the concept of subsidiarity.
16 Moreover, it is important not to confuse the proposition that the 
EU has a constitutional framework (probably best designated with small ‘c’ and small ‘f’) with 
the debate about whether Europe ought to have a Constitution, with a capital ‘C’. 
Despite the fears that the institution of the wider, looser European Union by the Treaty of 
Maastricht would lead to a dilution of the constitutional element of the previous European 
Communities, because of the intergovernmentalist character of the so-called second and 
third pillars, in fact there has generally been an acceleration in the turn to constitutionalism 
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14   Van Gend en Loos, p 12; emphasis added. 
15   See generally on this Shaw, 2000a, Chapter 5. 
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and normative discourse since Maastricht.
17 One reason has obviously been the attempt to 
counteract perceived public disillusionment with the European integration project by offering 
the idea of a constitution for the European Union, both as an actually existing framework and 
as a future project for development, as one way of guaranteeing government subject to the 
rule of law and respect for individual rights against majoritarian tyranny. It is also increasingly 
widely accepted that it is possible to conceive of the European Union – despite the diversity 
of legal arrangements which it encapsulates – as a single constitutional framework, with a 
single legal order. Amongst the most important factors linking right across the Union’s system 
are the common principles and values, especially those contained in Article 6(1) of the Treaty 
on European Union (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law).
18 It is no surprise that the debate over values and principles has been 
central to the Convention’s discussion of what constitutes the foundational framework for the 
European Union. 
Not all commentators who argue that the EU already has a constitutional framework 
necessarily agree that this would be ‘improved’ as a result of the Convention’s intervention. 
Notably, Joseph Weiler focuses on the risk that a constitution in a formal sense – especially if 
there were some attempt to depart from the international law basis of the current 
arrangement and to assert that the EU could be legitimated via popular participation at the 
present stage of its development – would upset the delicate constitutional balance based on 
‘tolerance’ which he identifies as the basis for the EU at the present stage. He argues that
19 
‘constitutional actors in the Member States accept the European constitutional discipline not 
because, as a matter of legal doctrine, as is the case in the federal state, they are 
subordinate to a higher sovereignty and authority attaching to norms validated by the federal 
people, the constitutional demos. They accept it as an autonomous voluntary act, endlessly 
renewed on each occasion, of subordination, in the discrete areas governed by Europe to a 
norm which is the aggregate expression of other wills, other political identities, other political 
communities.’ 
The resistance to the allures of the formal constitution makes Weiler, it would seem, 
something close to a constitutional absolutist or purist, restricting the ascription of ‘true 
constitution’ to a limited range of incidents of ‘polity-hood’ which satisfy certain conditions of 
process and substance generally associated most readily with states. In other words, states 
have an inbuilt advantage in terms of their need for, and  receptiveness of, formal 
constitutional frameworks which link political power to a constitutional demos, or pouvoir 
constituant. This is the field of legitimacy claims in which the European Union continues to 
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struggle, notwithstanding the institution of concepts such as European citizenship, or the 
establishment of a system of direct elections to the European Parliament and the investiture 
of greater powers in that directly elected body. 
Even for those convinced by the argument that a certain degree of constitutional formalism 
can offer legitimacy gains to a struggling European Union, in both the shorter and the longer 
terms, the complex history of constitution-building in the EU sketched here counsels against 
hasty conclusions about the impact of the Convention in relation to issues of either process 
or substance. Yet the tenor of President Giscard d’Estaing’s first speech to the opening 
session of the Convention on 28 February 2002 set out very clearly his belief in the 
constitutive power and capacity of the Convention. Mentioning the word ‘constitution’ three 
times, he then concluded with a powerful attempt to preempt much debate by declaring the 
aim of the Convention thus:
20 
‘The Laeken Declaration leaves the Convention free to choose between submitting options 
or making a single recommendation. It would be contrary to the logic of our approach to 
choose now. However, there is no doubt that, in the eyes of the public, our recommendation 
would carry considerable weight and authority if we could manage to achieve broad 
consensus on a single proposal which we could all present. If we were to reach consensus 
on this point, we would thus open the way towards a Constitution for Europe. In order to 
avoid any disagreement over semantics, let us agree now to call it: a “constitutional treaty for 
Europe”.’ (emphasis in the original) 
It is difficult to imagine a more effective presentation of the historical opportunity which 
Giscard saw the Convention as presenting – an opportunity which he might have seen in a 
certain sense as being for himself as an individual, but which he effectively portrayed to the 
new Convention as a collective opportunity. This sense of opportunity in turn spoke 
eloquently to the federalist majority amongst the Convention members, and so the 
endeavour has become Giscard’s main ‘gift’ to the Convention, which means that despite 
subsequent tensions, his leadership still retains a substantial element of goodwill amongst 
the ordinary Convention members. Even so, at the conclusion of the Convention’s 
deliberations in June 2003 but before the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conference 
which must follow in order to give formal effect to any new Treaty, it remained impossible to 
predict whether the Convention would succeed in pre-empting the IGC in any substantial 
respect. There has been undoubtedly some clear indicators dating back to the very 
beginning of the Convention’s work that it might well have a (surprisingly powerful) capacity 
to lock in the Member States and to constrain their freedom of action in the IGC. This has 
partly been because the Convention itself has become, in certain ways, more like an IGC, 
especially as the Member States began to take it more seriously and in many cases changed 
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their national representatives bringing in a number of key Foreign Ministers such as Joschka 
Fischer of Germany and Dominique de Villepin of France. Perhaps more crucially, in terms of 
the acceptability and legitimacy of any constitutional settlement coming out of this process, 
there is no strong evidence that the involvement of a wider range of elite actors in 
constitutional debate is necessarily going to facilitate the process of securing acceptance 
and therefore ratification by referendum or parliamentary assent within the Member States, 
after the IGC.
21 Moreover, a Convention charged most obviously with the task of overcoming 
long-standing blockages to reform of the ‘old’ European Community institutions and with 
simplifying the mind-boggling complexities of the European Union’s architectural structure 
has found how often these are themselves hedged around by the Court of Justice’s 
constitutionalising endeavours, in relation to issues such as rights, competences, the effects 
of EU law, and ‘interinstitutional balance’. A ‘simple’ commonsense prescription of 
constitutional fundamentals and of principles of legitimate political leadership was always 
likely to elude the grasp of the Convention members, however long they laboured. The 
proposition which this paper pursues is that unravelling the blend of the old and the new in 
the process and substance of the Convention’s work is a necessary precondition to making 
an assessment of its contribution to working towards a European Constitution. This approach 
is in line with my earlier argument not to develop  a priori assumptions about whether the 
Convention is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the EU’s development as a legitimate and effective polity.
22 
3. The procedural dimension of Convention-watching: 
the ‘building’ of the Convention ‘acquis’ 
When Convention-watching, it is commonplace to point out that the Convention is clearly 
more open, more transparent and more inclusive than an IGC, that it ‘decides’ by 
‘consensus’ and does not incorporate a set of formal veto arrangements, and that it involves 
a wider range of elites, giving an institutionalised voice to the European Parliament and to 
national parliaments in the process. These are points which are in some sense both otiose 
and banal, given that the Convention is a very different beast to the IGC both in terms of 
purpose and composition. 
                                                 
21   The involvement of a large number of Convention members concerned about precisely this question in terms 
of the acceptability of their own work in the initiative to persuade governments to hold a ‘single’ referendum on 
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European Constitution. This is an issue which is supported by euro-sceptics and federalists alike, albeit for 
different reasons. Further information on these initiatives and ideas can be found on the website of the 
Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (http://www.iri-europe.org/). For information about ratification 
processes in the Member States see http://eucon.europa2004.it/Watch_Q12.htm. In the UK it is almost 
inconceivable that a referendum will be  held, although there has been substantial political and media 
controversy about this question. 
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In fact, formal constitution-building in the European Union is a complex, multi-staged 
process, already involving an ever increasing range of actors.
23 While the first significant set 
of amendments to the EEC Treaty – the Single European Act of 1986 – might have occurred 
away from the glare of all but the most Euro-focussed publicity, subsequent cases of Treaty 
amendment, although often not front-page affairs, have attracted much more substantial 
media coverage, not least because of the referendum affairs in Denmark (Maastricht) and 
Ireland (Nice). As things stand, the Convention adds a further ‘pre-contractual’ stage to the 
process; it does not  – and cannot, at least until the rules of the game are themselves 
formally changed by Treaty amendment  – formally pre-empt or replace the 
Intergovernmental Conference as the site within which formal commitments are made 
between the Member States. The latter remain the legal ‘Masters of the Treaty’. On the other 
hand, so far as the Member States were required by  the Convention to engage in the 
endeavour to find compromise and consensus positions on key questions about the 
missions, functions, values and operating procedures and practices of the European Union 
which have historically been fudged or swept to the sidelines as posing insoluble problems, 
they did so in a very different framework to that of an intergovernmental conference. In part, 
they reacted to that by seeking to make the Convention more like an IGC, as more and more 
states nominated foreign ministers or other cabinet rank ministers to be their representatives 
on the Convention. On the other hand, the change in the environment partially enabled the 
Convention – and the Member States in particular – to break away from certain taboos which 
have constrained the latters’ behaviour within IGCs when discussing historical blocking 
points such as institutional reform and the question of the future of the institutional system 
designed in the 1950s for a ‘Community’ of Six, rather than a twenty-first century ‘Union’ of 
twenty-five plus. One clearly important innovation, for example, which created a very 
different feel to the Convention as compared to the IGC was the presence of national 
opposition parties through the medium of national parliamentary representatives and 
European parliamentary representatives, sitting in the same debating chamber and round the 
same negotiating table as national governmental representatives. This in some respects 
broke down the sense of the unitary ‘national’ interest as represented b y national 
governments which had often stifled the development of intergovernmental negotiations and 
ensured that they have predictably remained bargaining rather than deliberation scenarios. 
Indeed, this change seemed to offer the promise of deliberation – if not yet quite the reality, 
or so the consensus of reports from professional Convention-watchers generally has 
seemed to indicate.
24 
                                                 
23   Closa, 2003. 
24   Attempts to capture more of this promise of deliberation are evident in mid-stream changes to how the 
Convention works introduced by the Praesidium, such as the innovation of more frequent plenary meetings, 
the reduction in speaking time, and the decision to allow spontaneous interventions through the raising of 
‘blue cards’, all designed to reduce the tendency of plenary to be a sequence of ‘soap-box’ speeches: see 
‘Convention faces change of philosophy test’, www.euobserver.com, 27 February 2003.  I H S — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — 11 
One particularly important dimension of the Convention process has contributed directly to 
the linking of questions of p rocess and substance. This was the question of how the 
Convention should proceed, especially in the context of its ‘endgame’ involving the 
discussion, amendment and agreement of specific treaty provisions, towards putative 
agreement upon a Constitutional Treaty. It remains premature to enter final remarks on how 
this endgame should be understood. As a preliminary step, we can ask some questions 
about how we know about the endgame. Can we, for example, find out its details by looking 
at the Convention’s website? 
In fact, within just a few months of the Convention’s establishment, there was already an 
overwhelming body of written material on the Convention website. This effectively precluded 
the casual visitor to the site from gaining anything more than a very superficial review of 
what the Convention was and did from the very brief and relatively uninformative introductory 
materials which the website provided.
25 The website did not explain for the general user how 
and why the Convention was in fact working towards a new Constitutional Treaty, making 
reference briefly to some of the questions in the Laeken Declaration, but omitting any form of 
articulation of how the Convention agenda and approach shifted in its early months into the 
constitutional register.
26 Clicking on ‘Draft Constitutional Treaty’ on the website merely 
brought up the highly impenetrable skeleton put forward by the Praesidium in October 
2002,
27 the rafts of draft articles which have followed since January 2003, and the multitudes 
of amendments put forward by Convention members.
28 These were followed, as the texts 
were gradually put together, by successive Praesidium re-drafts, such that by the end of the 
hectic few final weeks it would only have been clear to a close observer of the events and of 
changes on the website exactly what was the final text of the four parts of the Constitutional 
Treaty ‘approved’ in Plenary on 13 June 2003.
29 That is the negative side of the Convention 
and its website, which was quickly turned into a tool which would be useful only to those 
staying very close to the Convention debate. The positive side of the website lies in that very 
same mass of material which is impenetrable to the casual visitor, but which can in fact 
reveal to those who have followed the process from the beginning much of the complexity 
and richness of the constitution-building process, and the different elements of which it is 
composed. 
                                                 
25   http://european-convention.eu.int/.  
26   Those with a more casual or occasional interest should turn to websites such as the Federal Trust EU 
Constitution Project (www.fedtrust.co.uk/eu_constitution) which observe the Convention from the outside. 
27   CONV 369/02 of 28 October 2002. 
28   See http://european-convention.eu.int/amendemTrait.asp?lang=EN. 
29   The most important documents were CONV 797/1/03 REV 1, Text of Part I and Part II of the Constitution, 12 
June 2003 and CONV 802/03, above n.8. The latter document was not finalised on 13 June 2003, as the 
Praesidium hoped to hold further meetings in early July 2003 to scrutinise and consider amendments in the 
specific areas of CFSP and JHA so far as these are covered by the detailed provisions of Part III. 12 — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — I H S 
 
This process has involved the creation and deployment for developmental purposes of the 
Convention’s own  acquis,
30 based on deliberations in working groups and plenary, the 
prefatory, summative and drafting work of the Secretariat including the preparation of 
working documents and questionnaires, reports, summaries of meetings and draft articles, 
and the discussions and r esolutions of the Praesidium. Not all of these processes and 
outcomes are equally public. Notably the Praesidium always deliberated behind closed 
doors, and notwithstanding objections,
31 did not produce minutes of its meetings. Working 
Group meetings, furthermore, were generally not open to public observation, whereas 
plenary meetings were not only public and televised (and fully linguistically accessible 
because of simultaneous interpretation), but were also recorded  verbatim in transcripts on 
the European  Parliament website, presently in the original language, but ultimately to be 
made available in all official languages. 
The analysis of Secretariat documentation  – much of which was passed via the Praesidium 
for approval and adopted as Praesidium documentation, perhaps after amendment  – is 
perhaps the most illuminating exercise in excavating the emergence of the Convention’s 
acquis. The Secretariat provided, inter alia, the bridge between the Convention and some of 
the most effective institutional players in the EU, namely the secretariats and legal services 
of the Council and the Commission, which have an unparalleled expertise in understanding 
the present state of EU law as well as a background as repeat players in IGCs over the 
years. The Convention Secretariat played an essential role in setting out the richness and 
variety of the EU’s existing constitutional  acquis by preparing and issuing documentation 
notes on issues such as the present system of competence distribution and allocation, the 
legal instruments of the EU, the nature of the open method of coordination, the state of play 
in external action and justice and home affairs, the role of national parliaments and the 
institutions of the EU, and on the regional and local dimension of EU governance. While 
largely descriptive, these papers have had the capacity also to shape debate because of 
their effective command of the current status quo. Allied to this, the Secretariat more directly 
shaped debate by preparing papers on questions such as the possibilities of simplification as 
envisaged by the Declaration on the Future of the Union and the Laeken Declaration.
32 In 
that sense, the Secretariat contributed directly to innovation as well as to explaining the 
relevance of the EU’s constitutional  acquis to the Convention’s own work. Inevitably, of 
                                                 
30   A term used by Convention Vice-Chairman Jean-Luc Dehaene, as quoted in Crum, 2003. 
31   Objections have come notably from Convention members in political factions which are not represented in the 
Praesidium, such as the Green/EFA working collaboration on the Convention and the GUE/NGL group. It is 
understood that in May 2003 the Praesidium decided that after the conclusion of the Convention’s work, its 
documents should be made publicly available via the website. 
32   See CONV 250/02 Simplification of the Treaties and Drawing up of a Constitutional Treaty, 10 September 
2002. It is unsurprising that the Secretariat has expertise on the specific question of simplification, because 
amongst its members is Hervé Bribosia, whose previous work included acting as Rapporteur on the European 
University Institute’s much quoted pre-Nice project on simplification of the treaties, which was sponsored by 
the European Commission: Robert Schuman Centre, 2000. For commentary, see Feus, 2001. I H S — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — 13 
course, the Secretariat provided the background expertise for the preparation of crucial 
documents such as the mandates of the working groups and (in almost all cases) the 
working group draft reports, under the political control of the Praesidium and the Chairs of 
the respective working groups who were in turn drawn from the Praesidium. Likewise, the 
Secretariat provided substantial input for crucial documents such as the October skeleton for 
a new Constitutional Treaty
33 and the subsequent tranches of draft articles and successive 
redrafts.
34 Interestingly it is not entirely clear to what extent there have been other, even less 
visible, influences (perhaps from the team personally assisting Giscard) upon some of those 
drafts. A good example is the idea of dual citizenship which is not a derivation from the 
existing treaties, which mysteriously appeared in the skeleton published in October 2002,
35 
but which disappeared from the February 2003 draft of Articles 1-16 in favour of a return to 
the text of the existing EC/EU Treaties.
36 What has been clear has been the Secretariat’s 
role in preparing reports on reactions to the draft articles and beginning the task of collating 
the huge number of amendments proposed, especially to Articles 1–16, a daunting exercise 
in the management of information and many competing initiatives. 
That comment leads directly to the final aspect of process which needs to be highlighted in 
this section of the paper, namely the management of the whole process of constitution-
building. When the Member States agreed, in the Laeken Declaration, to the establishment 
of the Convention, one of the ‘checks’ which they placed upon its capacity to produce 
unintended, and perhaps unwanted, outcomes was the nomination of ex-French president 
Giscard d’Estaing to chair the Convention, bearing in mind that he was a man known to have 
a capacity for strong leadership, a reputation for independence, but perhaps most crucially a 
proven background of support for a view of European integration which preserved a strong 
role for the states.
37 Doubtless many were surprised when Giscard so quickly seized the 
opportunity to make his distinctive mark by expressing his immediate preference for the 
option of producing a single report f rom the Convention, not a series of options, a report 
which would take the form of a Constitutional Treaty. Moreover, Giscard showed himself to 
be markedly undeterred by the complexity problem  – namely that the choice for a 
Constitutional Treaty itself begged the question of ‘fit’ and coherence with what needs to be 
carried over from the old Treaties in terms of institutional provisions, legal bases, and policy 
frameworks, and what needs to be decided new from scratch.
38 To that end, he instituted the 
                                                 
33   See n.27 above. 
34   These documents are too many to list separately. For guidance on how the separate tranches of articles built 
up into the final conclusions of the Convention see http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/constit_draftconsttreaty.htm. 
35   CONV 369/02, n.27 above, Article 5. 
36   CONV 528/03, 16 February 2003 (Articles 1–16), Article 7. 
37   See, for example, his advocacy of a cautious approach to enlargement, in the post-euro era: Giscard 
d’Estaing and Schmidt, 2000. 
38   It could be argued, indeed, that Giscard kept the members of the Convention busy with the constitution-
building aspects of its work in order to distract them from spending sixteen months discussing (falling out 
over?) the revisions to the institutional set-up inherited from the Treaty of Rome and tinkered with repeatedly 
in successive treaties, which were always going to be the most intractable problems facing the Convention 14 — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — I H S 
 
group  of legal experts from the European Union institutions, which has been charged with 
leading the way towards the drafting of Part Two of the Constitutional Treaty.
39 Indeed, one 
could surmise that the impact and effect of Giscard within the Convention and its work could 
be said to be one of the unintended and unexpected consequences of the process, rather 
than one of the checking factors serving the interests of Member States, presumed at the 
outset to be unwilling to countenance too dramatic a shift from the status quo. 
Giscard showed himself to be simultaneously both controlling and flexible in relation to the 
process of compiling the Treaty. Control stemmed above all from the insistence on issuing 
separate tranches of articles as these were approved by the Praesidium. This made it more 
difficult for those Convention members who were not on the Praesidium and who therefore 
had relatively little sense of the overall enterprise to address their comments to what they 
anticipated might be the final structure of the Constitutional Treaty, other than by relying on 
the original framework issued in October 2002. Furthermore, to the considerable 
disadvantage of national parliamentary members of the Convention who found it particularly 
difficult to fulfil their mandate to stay in touch with the views of their constituencies, very short 
deadlines were consistently given for submitting amendments and reactions to each fresh 
tranche of draft articles. 
There is also evidence from plenary debates that Giscard effectively controlled some of the 
most influential voices on the Convention  – that is, those who were on the Praesidium and 
who were therefore privy to the early drafts of Treaty articles and to the Praesidium’s own 
discussions about the direction the new Constitutional Treaty should take  – by using some 
form of cabinet collective responsibility to muzzle those who have argued their case for a 
different view, but who have lost out, in the Praesidium’s private meetings. Thus, at least up 
to the point when the Praesidium appeared to assert its authority in relation to the question 
of institutions,
40 there was no question of Praesidium debates being replayed in public in the 
plenary. Those who had lost the debate in the Praesidium could not bring the same 
amendments before the plenary. The Commission, with its numerically small representation 
(both full members are also members of the Praesidium), was particularly affected by the 
adoption of this approach since only its alternate members, who are not politicians of stature 
but r ather senior officials, were left unfettered by the application of such a doctrine of 
collective responsibility. This effectively turned around what might have been thought to be a 
                                                                                                                                          
and the ones least likely to be solved by the application of the deliberative aspects of the Convention-method. 
In fact, of course, there were many discussions of the institutional questions – but they were largely kept off 
the official agendas of the Working Groups, Discussion Circles and Plenary meetings. This was doubtless not 
an accident. 
39   CONV 529/03 of 6 February 2003 Remit of the group of experts nominated by the Legal Services. The 
group’s work very substantially influenced the provisions of Part III of the Treaty when it was first issued: 
CONV 725/03, 27 May 2003. 
40   See the original draft on institutions, Title IV of Part I, CONV 691/03, 23 April 2003. I H S — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — 15 
coup for the Commission, namely to have both of its full members on the Praesidium, and 
turned it into a double-edged sword in terms of plenary debates. 
Furthermore, control manifested itself in Giscard’s own summaries of plenary debates at the 
conclusion of individual Convention sessions, in his presentations from time to time o f the 
next steps which the Convention should take to advance its mandate, and in summaries of 
plenary meetings and working group meetings drawn up by the Secretariat (which doubtless 
received political approval before they were published). These latter summaries did not 
always receive unanimous support from ‘embedded’ Convention watchers as faithfully 
representing the debate. From time to time, the latter would have seen a particular point 
receiving very strong support from individual Convention members, where the meeting 
summary represented this as merely involving ‘a number of Convention members’. However, 
there is nothing surprising in this, as the role of the minute taker in a meeting has since time 
immemorial offered the opportunity to control the agenda as well as to present the outcomes 
of deliberations in a particular light. 
As to flexibility, this was demonstrated by the willingness to countenance the creation of new 
sub-groups of Convention members to deal with problems and issues as they have arisen, 
whether the Working Group on Social Europe which was set up right at the end of the 
Working Group phase in response to a bottom-up movement of Convention members, or the 
discussion circles on specific matters such as the Court of Justice,
41 budgetary matters and 
latterly the question of taxation. It is also evident from Giscard’s responsiveness to changing 
political contexts, such as his willingness to ‘pull’ the periodic report which he had hitherto 
delivered to each European Council meeting, when faced  with the risk of being almost 
completely squeezed out of the agenda at the Spring 2003 European Council in the wake of 
the UN Security Council debacle and the launch of the US/UK military action in Iraq. At the 
same time, it became clear that this ‘loss of face’ was being immediately counterbalanced by 
close collaboration with the Greek Presidency to implement a plan for the European Council 
to meet specifically to deal with Convention matters on 30 June 2003, although that plan 
eventually came to naught, and more specifically to place the Convention on the agenda of 
the European Council meeting in Athens in April 2003, which had been convened for the 
specific purpose of signing the Accession Treaties. 
What was particularly clear throughout the whole process was that there remained a signal 
lack of clarity about what the final product would look like. Literally hundreds of amendments 
                                                 
41   The approach to the Court of Justice taken in the Convention could be – and doubtless will be – severely 
criticised for its failure to take seriously fundamental questions about judicial architecture and judicial 
resources. So far as the Court  – institutionally  – is affected by the changes proposed  in the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, this comprises tinkering at the margins. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the 
changes – if and when instrumentalised in a new Treaty entering into force upon ratification – could lead to 
additional demands upon the Court, especially in relation to fundamental rights, following the incorporation of 
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were proposed by ordinary Convention members to each set of draft provisions put forward 
by the Praesidium, and only a proportion of these could be discussed at each plenary 
meeting. Thereafter, the Praesidium would ‘think again’, but the mass of Convention 
members were left largely in the dark as to what this might involve. Furthermore, the release 
of the draft provisions on the  institutions was delayed to such an extent  – they finally 
appeared to a great furore on 23 April 2003 – that it was hard to say how the whole product 
could be seen as positioned on the traditional intergovernmental/supranational continuum, 
which is so often measured in terms of certain key questions about institutional powers and 
interinstitutional relationships. This tended to fuel the conspiracy theorists who suggested 
that the final proposed Constitutional Treaty would magically appear in large measure from 
Giscard’s back pocket, or indeed from his top hat, in the manner of the magician’s proverbial 
rabbit, although in the event that fear was largely unfounded. However, a number of changes 
to the provisions introduced in the last hectic days and hours of  the Convention did not 
appear to have come in any meaningful way out of the Convention’s deliberations, such as 
the principle of ‘citizens’ initiatives’, tacked onto Article I -46 on the principle of participatory 
democracy. Furthermore, some of those involved in the Convention regularly expressed 
displeasure at finding what they believed to be unwarranted departures in the articles issued 
by the Praesidium from what they perceived to be the ‘results’ of the Convention’s work so 
far, embodied in its plenary discussions and its working group reports especially.
42 But so 
much was said within the Convention, with so many different meanings and purposes, that 
gleaning a single consensus from these expressions of view was inevitably a judgemental 
exercise. To that extent, one person’s consensus is another’s dissensus, as the contested 
summaries of Convention meetings made clear. For the purposes of the argument in this 
paper what is most important is that lack of clarity about the overall output can lead to 
competing and contesting positions being advanced about the extent to which the final 
product will or will not be innovatory compared to the current state of European constitutional 
law. For example, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-President of the Convention, called it ‘evolution 
not revolution’,
43 stressing that there will be much that is familiar to  cognoscenti of the 
existing Treaties in whatever is eventually proposed by the Convention. UK Government 
representative Peter Hain called it a ‘tidying up’ exercise. Usefully, for observers of the 
Convention, the reports on the separate tranches of articles and key Working Group Reports 
which were produced in quick succession in Spring 2003 by the UK House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Union
44 stressed in each case ‘what was new’ and ‘what was 
old’, and above all what was omitted in the new text from what was old, such as the 
                                                 
42   E.g. Hain, 2003; see also the interventions by Alain Lamassoure and others at the discussion of the Report of 
Working Group on Complementary Competences at the plenary of 7–8 November 2002. 
43   Dehaene, 2003: 6. 
44   See the numerous reports available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldeucom.htm.  I H S — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — 17 
reference to ‘ever closer union amongst the peoples of Europe’ which did not appear in the 
Praesidium’s draft of Articles 1–16 of the draft Constitutional Treaty.
45 
It is this focus on the new/old combination of constitutional acquis refracted into the new 
Constitutional Treaty via the prism of the Convention’s deliberations, and the creation of the 
sense of an autonomous Convention acquis, which leads from the focus on the Convention 
as process into a final reflection in this paper upon questions of constitutional substance. 
This is the last step in this paper’s endeavour to provide a close description of how the 
Convention is simultaneously both rooted in the ‘old’ constitutional framework of the EU, as 
well as constantly toying with innovations and new ideas. This section will concentrate upon 
just a small number of substantive issues which taxed the Convention, namely the treatment 
of fundamental rights in the Constitutional Treaty, the issues of sovereignty and supremacy in 
relations between EU law and national law and between the EU and the Member States, and 
the questions of competence division and exercise. 
4. The substantive dimension of Convention-
watching: working towards a European Constitution? 
Rights; supremacy/sovereignty; competences. These are three key issues which underpin 
the most sensitive normative aspects of the draft Constitutional Treaty agreed upon by the 
Convention in June 2003. They are issues which go to the heart of the question: what is the 
European Union and what functions ought it to serve? I shall examine each in turn, the point 
being less to critique the approach taken by the Convention itself, but rather to show how the 
Convention had to face up to the delicate task of blending innovation and acquis, especially 
in so far as it could not (or should not) ignore the considerable extent to which the EU as it 
stands, at least as a proto-constitutional order, is a judicial creation. They also go to the heart 
of the fear that a formal constitutional settlement risks disturbing the delicate balance which 
underpins the current constitutional framework.
46  
It is hard to imagine a modern liberal polity with constitutional pretensions without some form 
of (binding) bill of rights as a definitive statement of social and civic values (as opposed to ad 
hoc protection of fundamental rights via the more elastic concept of general principles of law 
which is the status quo under EU law at p resent).
47 How should the Constitutional Treaty 
                                                 
45   CONV 528/03, n.34 above. The term ‘ever closer union’ originated in the Preamble to the EEC Treaty, and 
was taken up in Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union. 
46   See the discussion of Joseph Weiler’s position at n.19 above.  
47   This does not appear to be the view of the UK Government, as demonstrated by its response to the 6
th Report 
of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Session 2002–2003, which considered The 
Future Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In response to the Committee’s comment that ‘any 
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take up this challenge? In that context, what should be done with the pre-existing but 
currently non-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights for the EU? 
Given the United Kingdom’s signal awkwardness in the context of the drafting of the Charter 
during the course of 2000, and its double insistence on both the inclusion of certain 
‘horizontal’ clauses which would limit the scope and effect of the Charter if it were legally 
binding and the apparently unconditional rejection of the possibility of the Charter as drafted 
ever being adopted as a legally binding instrument, the position taken by the UK in the 
course of the deliberations of the Working Group on the legal status of the Charter was 
widely thought of as an important breakthrough.
48 While insisting again on the further 
strengthening of the horizontal clauses, the UK did not dissent from a ‘consensus’ view that 
the Charter ought to be incorporated as legally binding into the Constitutional Treaty, a view 
which was widely shared in plenary debates on this question. In the event, that was the 
approach adopted by the Convention.
49 Far from settling all the relevant issues, however, the 
effect of this changed political determination on the part of a previously dissenting Member 
State was to open more questions than it answered, and indeed not all of the questions can 
be answered just by looking at the texts finally approved by the Convention in June 2003.
50 
A first line of enquiry concerned the nature of the invocation o f the Charter as a legally 
binding part of the new constitutional framework. Was it best to incorporate the Charter ‘by 
reference’, while leaving it in a separate document indirectly given legal force? Or should it 
be incorporated as an integral and explicit part of the text of the Constitutional Treaty? Once 
the latter solution was adopted, a further question arose: where in the Constitutional Treaty 
did it belong? At the beginning, before the general principles of the Union itself are 
articulated? Somewhere in the middle of Part I of the Constitutional Treaty, which sets out 
the constitutional framework of the Union? In a separate Part II or Part III of the Treaty, 
where its separateness would not break up the flow of the rest of the constitutional text? Or 
in an Annex or Protocol to the Constitutional Treaty, where it risked looking somehow 
downgraded in relation to the rest of the constitutional documentation. One factor was very 
important to the location debate. While the Charter was drafted on an ‘as if’ presumption, 
which reflected an intention to draft a text which was capable of being given legal force 
without further alteration, it was also drafted on the assumption that it was a separate text to 
the Union treaties. Thus its final provisions or horizontal clauses not only contained the 
infamous attempts to ensure that the Charter could not be interpreted as extending the 
                                                                                                                                          
‘does not accept that any new constitution has to have a bill of rights’, preferring instead – it would appear – 
the ‘respectable argument’ that the status quo system of fundamental rights protection was sufficient (House 
of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 27
th Report, Session 2002–2003). In the end, the UK did 
not or perhaps could not prevent the Charter being formally included in the Constitution approved by the 
Convention, although that does not finally settle the question, given that the matter is now before the IGC. 
48   Final Report of the Working Group, CONV 354/02, 22 October 2002. 
49   See CONV 726/03, 26 June 2003, Draft of Part II with comments. 
50   See generally de Búrca, 2003; Brand, 2003; Vranes, 2003. I H S — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — 19 
scope of Union competence and that its effects vis-à-vis the Member States would be limited 
(see especially Article 51 of the Charter as currently drafted
51), but also provisions which 
protected the integrity of legal fundamental rights protection under national law, Union law 
and international law, for the benefit of individuals (see especially Article 53). Once the 
Convention resolved to incorporate the Charter as part of the Constitutional Treaty largely 
unamended, so that the problem of overlap would be bound to continue with the other 
provisions of the Constitution, then it needed certainly to address the issues which framed 
the intentions of those who drafted the Charter of Rights before it decided upon the question 
of location. 
However, even after settling upon the inclusion of the Charter as Part II of the draft 
Constitution, there remain some key questions about the relationship  between the Charter 
and other sources of fundamental rights. The distinctive character of the Union’s hitherto 
judge-led system of enforcement of fundamental rights, which has been based on Article 220 
EC (‘the Court shall ensure that the law is observed’) and Article 6(2) TEU (which is 
effectively a codification of Court case law, although it refers only to the ECHR amongst 
international human rights instruments), has been its dynamic and fluid character. This 
included the possibility that the Court could refer to a substantial variety of possible sources 
of ‘Community fundamental rights’, including national constitutional traditions and different 
international law instruments, including but not confined to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’). It has frequently referred to other 
fundamental rights sources such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
and the European Social Charter in its case law. That acquis is to be carried forward into the 
post-Constitution era, as the Charter will not become an  exclusive  source of the Union’s 
fundamental rights, although the privileged position of the ECHR will continue for a number 
of reasons. First, the reference to the ECHR is preserved in Article I–7(3), which  effectively 
perpetuates the old Article 6(2) TEU. In the longer term, the Court of Justice may have to 
consider any possible dissonances between the legal force of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the continuing recognition of fundamental rights as  general principles of law 
within the EU legal order (Article I–7(3)). Second, the text of Article 52(3) of the Charter is 
unchanged and this requires the meaning and scope of Charter rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be ‘the same as those laid down by the’ ECHR. Finally, 
considerable complexity regarding the legal structures of rights protection in the future, 
should the Union succeed in the project promised in Article I –7(2) that it ‘shall seek’ 
accession to the ECHR. This is a proposal long supported by the influential House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Union, amongst other voices.
52 
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Finally, there is the sticky question of the content of the Charter and its relationship to the 
rest of EU law. There are substantial areas of overlap between the Charter and other 
provisions of EU law that have been included in the Constitution, whether in Part I on general 
principles and constitutional structure, or in Part III on policies. Adjustment of the two sets of 
provisions to each o ther, or at least cross-reference, could have assisted the project of 
ensuring harmony of interpretation, but fell foul, in essence, of the desire not to disturb the 
text of the Charter.
53 Article 52(2) of the Charter already recognises the overlap issue, b y 
requiring that rights recognised by the Charter which are based on EU law are exercised in 
accordance with the conditions of the EU treaties, and this provision was picked up again in 
Article II–52(2) of the Constitution. This seems to suggest that two sets of provisions could 
co-exist comfortably. Even so, there is likely to be a substantial task for the Court of Justice 
to determine the scope and effects of rights provisions especially where there is overlap 
between the Charter and the other sections of the Constitution. Its task here will be to create 
synergies between the wider and already embedded  acquis which it has developed in 
concordance with the existing treaties, and the  acquis of the Convention and the new 
constitutional settlement. In a trenchant critique of problems raised by the juxtaposition of the 
Charter and the rest of the Constitution, Erich Vranes argues that ‘existing doubts are 
reinforced as to whether the much-discussed “Convention method” really allows an 
appropriate treatment of fundamental, albeit technically intricate problems.’ As he remarks, ‘it 
may be comparatively easy to formulate the substantive fundamental rights provisions of a 
fundamental rights catalogue, as these necessarily consist of “open”, i.e.indeterminate legal 
notions which have to be concretized on a case by case basis in years of jurisprudence. 
However, it is arguably disproportionately more difficult to embed such a catalogue into the 
multilevel EU and national legal orders and their interlinked fundamental rights systems – the 
results of which are particularly disputed and which are also interlaced with other European 
and international human rights instruments – in a manner which does not only avoid new but 
satisfactorily resolves future legal problems ex ante’.
54 
The EU is a post-national polity, suspended between national polities and international 
regimes. The challenges of ensuring legitimate and effective governance will necessarily 
give rise to some difficult questions about how to articulate both the longstanding (judicial) 
principle of the supremacy of the law of the EU and the gradual consequential transformation 
of the traditionally singular sovereignty of Westphalian states into the shared sovereignty of a 
multi-level governance structure. The question  arose as to how each of these judicial 
principles should be reflected in the Constitutional Treaty. For the UK, it was logical to object 
to the expression used in Article 1 of the Praesidium’s first draft of the Treaty to the effect 
that ‘this Constitution establishes the Union’,
55 since the clear derivation from the 
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international law nature of the Union is that the Member States establish the Union and that 
the powers of the Union flow from the Member States, so that the Constitution has only a 
derived and not an original status. The language of the Praesidium’s draft subtly crosses the 
bridge between regime and polity, and challenges concepts of Westphalian sovereignty. The 
explicit reference to the primacy of EU law in Article 9(1) of the Praesidium’s first draft also 
riled the UK. However, the statement that ‘the Constitution, and law adopted by the Union 
Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it by the Constitution, shall have primacy 
over the law of the Member States’ is – as many commented  in the plenary debate on 5 
March 2003 – quite unexceptionable in view of the position under EU law as it stands. Take 
the Court’s statement in 1964, in Costa v. ENEL that 
‘The transfer by the States from their domestic legal systems to the Community legal system 
of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of 
their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the 
concept of the Community cannot prevail.’
56 
Quite apart from what that statement asserts about the nature of what was then ‘Community 
law’, one of the most controversial statements concerned the so-called ‘permanent’ limitation 
of sovereign rights. We will return to this in a moment. Staying with the supremacy question, 
for the moment, it is still worth considering whether or not it is indeed quite unproblematic to 
insert a supremacy clause into the Constitution, on the grounds of the fact that this is already 
a facet of the Union’s constitutional order
57. What the insertion could signal would be an 
important step towards the merging of the ‘judicial constitution’ and the formal legal 
constitution being worked on by the Convention. It could be said that this is in the spirit of 
Article 6(2) TEU, referred to above, which codifies some aspects of the Court’s case law on 
fundamental rights. Pursuing the analogy with Article 6(2) TEU, however, it is equally clear 
that this simple provision does not refer in full to the complex case law in which, for example, 
the Court has addressed the question of the extent to which Member States are bound by 
the Union’s fundamental rights guarantees when they are acting in some way in 
implementation of, or within the scope of, EU law. One thing is for sure, that case law does 
not speak with a  single voice, and what is more, its interpretation is highly controversial 
amongst legal academics. It is interesting to note that partly to preserve the integrity of EU 
law as a system, the Council Legal Service was heavily involved during the negotiations of 
the Fundamental Rights Charter in 2000 in seeking to bridge the gap between the Court’s 
case law and the text of the Charter itself, including its restrictive horizontal clauses. This 
was achieved through the drafting of the ‘explanations’ published alongside the Charter in 
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October 2000.
58 These explanations referred to the Court’s existing case law on the effects 
of the Union’s fundamental rights vis-à-vis the Member States as a statement of the present 
law, and the importance of these explanations has been buttressed by an amendment to the 
Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights as it has been incorporated in Part II of the 
draft Constitution, to the effect that ‘the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union 
and the Member States with due regard to the explanations prepared at the instigation of the 
Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter.’ What emerges from this saga 
about fundamental rights and the Court’s case law so far as concerns the question of the 
‘codification’ of the principle of supremacy is, of course, that codification or consolidation
59 of 
the ‘judicial constitution’ will never be entirely unproblematic. Dougan’s analysis makes clear 
that problems will arise in the case of supremacy,
60 just as Vranes has done likewise in 
relation to fundamental rights.
61 
One area of debate is the precise meaning of the supremacy principle, whether as general 
principle of hierarchy or as specific conflicts-resolution tool. That point is not insuperable, if 
one accepts that any constitutional provision on supremacy would in turn require substantial 
judicial elaboration over a period of time, and into that elaboration would be built in the 
different macro- and micro-level functions of the existing principle and associated legal 
doctrine, with the Court of Justice drawing upon the rich judicial acquis since Van Gend en 
Loos and Costa v. ENEL and perhaps adapting it to the changed circumstances generated 
by the Convention and the IGC. Furthermore, the argument that to include the supremacy 
principle is to draw attention to a facet of EU law best left hidden and visible only to legal 
experts and other elites is constitutionally disreputable. On the other hand, there have been 
problems with the apparent generality of the principle as set out in the version of Article 9(1) 
included in the first draft of Articles 1 –16 of the Constitution, in so far as it does indeed 
purport to apply to the whole of the Union as a single legal edifice, including the old second 
and third pillars. Even if the  Union becomes a single legal entity, the now ‘subterranean 
pillars’
62 will continue to have legal and political effects, especially in terms of the differing 
types of competences given to the institutions and the varying effects of the instruments in 
relation to different areas of Union activity. A distinction will continue to be drawn between 
‘first pillar’ matters, to which the principle of supremacy is currently limited, perhaps now 
joined by the third pillar, if the developing trend towards ‘communitarisation’ of all aspects of 
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justice and home affairs policy continues, and the area of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. A principle of supremacy drawn from the case law of the Court of Justice on the EC 
Treaty might be thought simply inappropriate to this latter field of Union activity. Above all, 
though, the inclusion of the supremacy principle – like the reference to the foundational 
nature of the Constitution in the Praesidium’s draft of Article 1  – draws attention to the 
possibility that the Union is bridging the gap between regime and polity. The formal assertion 
of supremacy in this way heightens the tension between the EU legal order and the national 
legal orders by reinforcing the fact that in many respects, as things stand at present, the 
various systems make incommensurable claims, especially about so-called ‘competence-
competence’ (the power to determine the legitimate scope of competence), and that serious 
conflicts are generally avoided by judicial interpretation of these incommensurable claims, 
not by the intractable pursuit of fundamentally incompatible principles such as the 
supremacy of EU law or the sovereignty of the Member States under international law. To 
assert as much in the Constitution may be to scratch at the evident sensibilities of many 
national constitutional courts, many of which prefer to rationalise the supremacy of EU law 
by reference to their own constitutional systems rather than the logic supplied by the Court of 
Justice, not to mention public opinion in a number of Member States. Of course, that may be 
the intended effect, but there is no doubt that crossing that particular rubicon will still require 
something akin to a constitutional revolution in Europe and in the Member States. In the 
event, in intermediate versions of Title I of Part I of the Constitution put before the 
Praesidium the supremacy principle was not included at all in the section on competences, 
but was slated for inclusion as part of a provision which subsequently became Article I–5 in 
the final version, on relations between the Member States and the Union.
63 This contains the 
so-called loyalty principle, a version of what is presently set out in Article 10 of the EC 
Treaty, which is as far as the Treaty texts currently in force go towards formally recognising 
the supremacy of EU law.
64 However, by the time a full draft of Part I went back to the 
Plenary at the end of May 2003, the supremacy principle was (back) in – although with some 
renumbering resulting from changes in earlier articles it now appears as Article I–10.
65 The 
Praesidium ‘explanations’ were terse in the extreme on this question: ‘The reference to the 
principle of primacy has been accepted, as it is a basic principle of the Union legal system 
which has to be laid down in the Constitution.’
66 This is unlikely to be the end of the story for 
the principle of supremacy. 
Returning to the question of the ‘permanent’ effects of joining the EU, the reference to 
‘permanent limitation’ in  Costa v. ENEL seemed to some to suggest that a Member State 
could not secede from the EC/EU  – a point flatly contradicted in 1981 when Greenland 
seceded (as part of the untangling of its relations with Denmark). One way in which the old 
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will blend with the new in interesting ways in the ‘new’ Union concerns the inclusion of a 
secession or voluntary withdrawal clause.
67 The approach taken in the Constitution (Article I–
59) seems to imply a slightly different emphasis to the position elaborated for Canada and 
the case of (potential) Quebec secession by the Canadian Supreme Court.
68 The Court 
introduced a clear duty on the part of all concerned to negotiate in good faith should a 
majority of the people of Quebec decide that they wished to secede from the Canadian 
federation. Article I–59 of the Constitutional Treaty is premised on the ‘decision to withdraw’, 
which is a unilateral act taken in accordance with the constitutional requirements of each 
Member State. Thereafter, the assumption is withdrawal will indeed occur, with the Union 
negotiating and concluding an agreement for withdrawal based on guidelines drawn up by 
the European Council, and the seceding Member State is excluded from the discussions in 
the Council and the European Council on the withdrawal agreement. Withdrawal can also 
take effect automatically after notification  of the decision to withdraw, notwithstanding the 
absence of an agreement, unless the European Council decides otherwise. The framework 
thus assumes an immediate reinstitution of the arm’s length relationship between members 
and non-members, a point buttressed by the insistence in Article I–59(4) that a state having 
once withdrawn must apply to rejoin via the normal route laid down in Article I–57. There is 
to be no halfway house associate membership or automatic right to rejoin. This aspect of the 
provision is tougher in the final version than in the original draft.
69 Interestingly, in contrast to 
Canada, where much important constitutional doctrine, such as on the twin principles of 
constitutionalism and democracy, has been judicially elaborated in the context of the whole 
issue of Quebec’s potential secession and ongoing ‘difference’ from the rest of Canada, 
there has been no judicial interventions thus far on this issue.
70 
Turning, finally, to the issue of competences, it is widely thought – wrongly, quite probably – 
that there has been an unstoppable ‘competence creep’ in which the EU and its institutions 
have gradually encroached upon the (protected, sovereign) spheres of the Member States.
71 
Even if the argument is largely wrongheaded, and is based on a perverted view of the 
politics of law-making in the EU context as a politics of winners and losers,
72 one of the 
greatest challenges for the Convention concerned how it should react to the argument 
bearing in mind that the existing system governing competence  attribution, exercise and 
control is hardly a paragon of clarity in the EU and could certainly benefit from an overhaul. 
However, once the choice was made for some sort of systematisation of types of 
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competence and areas of competence, there could be little assistance from the Court’s case 
law. Notwithstanding its usage of the terms exclusive and shared competence in the external 
relations sphere, the way in which the Court has approached the question has simply not 
been rationalised in terms of types or categories of competence. On the contrary, it has used 
the principle of attribution, which has unsurprisingly been preserved in Article I –9(2). 
Attribution has been widely used by the Court as the basis for establishing and testing the 
limits of competence by examining the scope and context of  each individual legal basis to 
ensure that measures adopted on that basis correspond not only to the specific terms of that 
legal basis, but also to the wider  ethos of EU law. That was the clear implication of the 
Court’s rather contested judgment in the  Tobacco Advertising Directive Case,
73 in which it 
declared in quite trenchant terms the outer limits of EU competence in respect of the 
regulation of cross-border advertising of tobacco products, both in relation to the regulation 
of the internal market and also in relation to the question of the protection of public health. 
Indeed, in terms of the existence of competence, attribution is the only general principle that 
can be found in the Treaties as they are presently drafted, along with a vast number of legal 
bases, some of which are more carefully delineated than others, and of which Article 308 EC 
giving an implied power to regulate matters falling within the scope of the objectives of the 
Treaty is the most controversial. In addition, the Court has also evolved additional judicial 
principles such as the preemption of national legislative competence in certain 
circumstances and the doctrine of implied powers to buttress the attribution principle from 
the point of view of the efficacy of EU governance. Other principles, such as subsidiarity and 
proportionality, govern only the exercise of competence. 
The original draft provisions on categories of competence prepared by the Praesidium were 
exceptionally inelegantly drafted.
74 Drafting style is a resolvable difficulty, and the final 
versions (Title III of Part I) are a considerable improvement, and also contain a more 
reasonable resolution of the division between exclusive and shared competence, especially 
in relation to the internal market. It remains a lingering difficulty, however, that the attempt to 
introduce a ‘categories’ approach drawn from the experience of other (national) federations 
does not appear to fit well with the existing approach to competences which constitutes the 
acquis communautaire in this area. One can anticipate, therefore, that a move in this 
direction could precipitate considerable uncertainty as the institutions, and especially the 
Court, adjust to the new approach, assuming the Constitution is adopted by the IGC and 
ratified at national level in due course. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper has offered a close examination of some key aspects of the emergent ‘new’ 
European Constitution, or draft Constitutional Treaty, via a focus on the questions of process 
and substance which shaped the work of the Convention on the Future of the Union. The 
paper had a set of very modest objectives, namely to link debates about the Convention 
process to the substance of constitution-building and to show the influence of both the old 
Union  acquis and the new mixed  acquis of the Convention itself on the shaping of an 
anticipated new constitutional settlement for the EU. It has not been an attempt to provide an 
interim assessment of the results of the Convention, in terms of either process or substance. 
It is clear that in some cases the fit between the two is quite unsatisfactory, and this will 
generate legal and perhaps political uncertainty for a substantial period of time. Above all, in 
this context, simplification – that old mantra – can by no means be guaranteed. Throughout, 
the Convention’s work has undoubtedly provoked quite strong reactions, ranging from fierce 
optimism to rather depressed pessimism, even amongst those who share the view that 
constitutionalism can and should, if pursued effectively as a set of premises about legitimate 
rule, offer some sort of legitimacy surplus to the presently much maligned EU. Balance is 
clearly a key issue: balancing the interests of the various constituencies with a stake in the 
Convention to ensure maximum acceptability of its final product; balancing growing 
scepticism amongst publics about political institutions with the evident sense of goodwill 
towards European institutions frequently charted in Euro-barometer polls which indicates that 
Europe ought to be given a decent chance to establish itself; finally, and perhaps most 
crucially, balancing the new and the old in the Constitution, and re-engaging with one of the 
oldest conundrums of legitimacy, namely balancing the responsiveness of institutions 
including guarantees of participation, with the need for effective governance and leadership 
in an ever more uncertain world. I H S — Jo Shaw / What’s in a Convention? — 27 
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